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ABSTRACT
Much attention has been drawn to the 
cognitive basis of innovation. While 
interesting in many ways, this poses the 
threat of falling back to traditional internalist 
assumptions with regard to cognition. We 
oppose the ensuing contrast between 
internal cognitive processing and external 
public practices and technologies that such 
internal cognitive systems might produce 
and utilize. We argue that innovation is best 
understood from the gibsonian notion of 
affordance, and that many innovative 
practices emerge from the external 
scaffolding of cognitive processes. The 
public engageability that allows the 
disclosure of hidden affordances is not only 
–not even primarily– a property of cognitive 
products, but of cognitive processes. We 
elaborate on this claims by drawing on 
Dutilh Novaes’ account of formal languages 
as cognitive technologies and Hutto’s 
Narrative Practice Hypothesis. This paves 
the way to sketch some general principles 
on how to strategically seek for innovation 
by targeting hidden affordances.
KEYWORDS: Innovation, affordance, 
cognitive scaffolding. 
RESUMEN
Los estudios sobre innovación han 
prestado mucha atención a sus bases 
cognitivas. Esa perspectiva corre el riesgo 
de caer en los supuestos internalistas 
tradicionales. Nos oponemos, pues, al 
contraste entre el procesamiento cognitivo 
interno y las prácticas y tecnologías 
públicas externas que dichos sistemas 
cognitivos producen y usan. Sostenemos 
que la innovación se entiende mejor desde 
la noción gibsoniana de affordance, y que 
muchas prácticas innovadoras emergen 
del scaffolding externo de procesos 
cognitivos. El carácter público y 
participativo que permite sacar a la luz 
affordances escondidas no es solo 
propiedad de los productos cognitivos, sino 
de procesos cognitivos. En nuestra 
propuesta, recurrimos a la teoría de Dutilh 
Novaes sobre los lenguajes formales como 
tecnologías cognitivas y a la teoría de 
Hutto acerca de las prácticas narrativas. 
Esto allana el camino para bosquejar 
algunos principios generales acerca de 
cómo perseguir estratégicamente la 
innovación rastreando affordances ocultas.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Innovación, 
affordances, scaffolding cognitivo.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Although  innovation  has  been  long  held  to  be  a  multifaceted  and  complex 
phenomenon, the academic interest on innovation, driven by economic and managerial 
concerns, was once dominated by accounts focusing on the social and organizational 
determinants of innovation.  Such an scenario is changing, though, as the spotlight is 
being  shifted  from the external factors of innovation to the internal  ones  (Clapham, 
2003;  Shavinina  and  Seeratan,  2003;  Simonton,  2003;  Sternberg,  Pretz  and 
Kaupfman,  2003).  Shavinina  and  Seeratan  clearly  illustrate  this  ongoing  trend:  «A 
growing body of literature suggests that innovation originates from within the individual, 
that  is,  from  his  or  her  new  idea(s).  Various  definitions,  models,  and  theories  of 
creativity  and  innovation  include  the  ‘generation  of  new  ideas’  as  one  of  their 
components» (2003, p.31). 
Much attention has been drawn to the psychological processes that underlie 
innovation (Kaufmann, 2003; Root-Bernstein & Root-Bernstein, 2003; Weisberg, 2003), 
and  even  to  the  neurophysiological  basis  of  innovation  (Vandervert,  2003).  While 
interesting in many ways, this poses the threat of falling back to traditional internalist 
assumptions  with  regard  to  cognition.  Until  recently,  and  without  denying  that  the 
external  world  plays  an  important  role  in  mental  phenomena,  cognition  has  been 
commonly  approached  as  a  set  of  internal  structures  and  mechanisms  whose 
operations  are  explanatorily  autonomous from the world,  shielded  by some sort  of 
sensorimotor interface. The ensuing opposition of internal and external factors is visible 
in the way Shavina and Seeratan frame their desiderata for research on innovation: 
There  is  a  need  for  a  new  direction  for  research  that  considers  individual 
innovation as the sum of its two important aspects: its external manifestations 
and its psychological basis. (…) From this fundamentally changed viewpoint, 
scientists  should  study an individual’s  mental  or  cognitive  experience—more 
precisely,  the  specificity  of  its  structural  organization.  We  assert  that  the 
individual  cognitive  experience  is  the  psychological  basis  of  individual 
innovation (2003, p.32).
We  oppose  such  contrast  between  the  internal  cognitive  processes  leading  to 
innovation,  on the one hand,  and the innovative  uses of  external  resources,  public 
practices and technologies that such internal cognitive systems might enable, on the 
other hand. Far from being clearly distinct dimensions of innovation, we believe that 
internal  and  external  factors  are  deeply  intertwined  in  any  feasible  explanation  of 
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innovation,  and  that  to  equate  internal  with  cognitive  factors  and  external  with 
noncognitive,  social  or organizational  factors is misleading.  Despite how tempting it 
might be, the divide and conquer strategy of isolating either the internal or the external 
rests on an assumption of organismic ‘boundaries of cognition’ which should not be 
taken for granted, as it is nowadays reasonably contested (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; 
Hutchins, 1995; Menary, 2007, 2010; Sutton, 2010).
2. INNOVATION AS THE DISCLOSURE OF HIDDEN AFFORDANCES
Innovation  is  characterized  in  many  ways  across  the  literature  (Fagerberg,  2004). 
Some authors opt to take a broad approach. Shavina and Seeratan claim that «many 
innovation scholars —including us— would agree (…) that innovation is the generation, 
acceptance,  and  implementation  of  new  ideas,  processes,  products,  or  services» 
(2003, p.32). Whether we take such a broad notion of innovation or a more technical 
one,  such as that  presented by Sternberg,  Pretz and Kaufman (2003),  it  stands to 
reason that innovating has something to do with the employment of previously unused 
or rarely used resources and strategies to alter some aspects of a certain situation. For 
that  to be possible,  the situation itself  has to fulfil  an objective condition:  it  has to 
provide the agent with some possibilities for action that were not actually in use prior to 
the innovation (or at the very least, not in a regular manner). This condition obtains 
both if the possibilities previously provided by the situation were not actually in use and 
if they simply were not there (i.e., if they genuinely appear with the innovation).1
The crux of the matter is not whether this condition is fulfilled by ‘internal’  or 
‘external’ means, but  that if the word ’innovation’ is to refer to something else than a 
very subjective appraisal of the value of an action course, it has to involve in some way 
the existence of unactualized possibilities for action. Those possibilities, in turn, have to 
be both adequate to the agent's capacities and skills and independent of his or her 
understanding  of  the  situation  at  any  given  moment.  While  the  realization  of  the 
possibilities  may depend on ‘subjective’ conditions (i.e., it  may require awareness or 
even deliberation on the side of the agent), the possibilities as such are independent of 
the agent’s perception.
We believe that  the  gibsonian notion of  affordance (Gibson 1977,  1979) fits 
wonderfully  in  place here.2 Gibson’s  affordances are defined as objective  relational 
features of  an environment,  considered with regards to a specific  agent  or  kind of 
1 However, it is not necessary to go into metaphysical questions about novelty to follow our argument. 
2 Not to be confused with Norman’s (1988) early use of the term “perceived affordances”. A clarification of  
the uses of the term can be found in McGrenere & Ho (2008).
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agent. They are, in a sense, ready to be used by the agent, but their being there does 
not depend on what the agent ultimately does. For instance, the presence of a fruit at a 
certain place can afford humans in the neighbouring area the possibility of grasping it 
and eating it. The graspability and eatability of the fruit does not depend, however, on 
any human actually doing anything at all: most affordances do, in fact, stay unused. 
Besides, not all affordances are as “natural” as the graspability and eatability of ripe fruits.  
We will encounter examples of this kind below.
Obviously, the mere fact of it involving affordances does not make a situation 
suitable for innovation.  For innovation to appear,  at least  some of the resources or 
strategies  used  (i.e.,  some  of  the  actions  afforded  by  the  situation  and  actually 
performed by  the agent)  have  to  fulfil  two  already  cited  further  conditions:  that  of 
contributing  to deliberate  problem solving,  and that  of  not  being usually  employed. 
Grasping an apple may help solve a problem, but it is not an example of innovation 
unless one does it in a very non-standard and yet advantageous way. 
Luckily, Gaver (2011) defines a subcategory of affordances that automatically 
meets this condition: hidden affordances. A hidden affordance is an affordance which 
remains unperceived by the agent due to a lack of directly related available information 
in a certain situation; its existence, however, can be inferred from other evidence. 
Keeping  close  to  this  definition  we  can  further  specify  two  kinds  of  hidden 
affordances. The first kind includes those affordances which are neither actually in use 
nor  properly  perceived  as  such  prior  to  their  explicit  discovery,  but  which  can  be 
considered, however, to have been implicitly perceived before that, such that e.g. the 
agent just has to single out some properties that were perceptible but not salient to 
visibilize the affordance. A wooden chair, for instance, can be used as fuel for a hearth 
fire  in  some  situations,  but  this  ‘comfort-providing  flammability’  tends  to  remain 
undetected.
In contrast to hidden affordances of the ‘chair-burning’  kind,  there are some 
occasions in which an affordance is not just not salient, but hidden in a stronger sense. 
In many of  these cases the hidden affordance exists as a result  (either wanted or 
unwanted) of a goal-oriented design of some kind. The paradigmatic case is that of the 
room containing a secret door: by gibsonian (and graverian) standards, the presence of 
a  secret  door  affords  any person in  the room the possibility  of  walking  through it. 
Unearthing this affordance, however, involves a lot more than ‘singling out’ unobvious 
properties, as the idea of a secret door implies the presence of deliberate concealing 
mechanisms.
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Of  course,  this  is  an  intuitive  distinction,  which  admits  a  lot  of  in-between 
situations and does not intend to ‘carve nature at its joints’.  It  could be argued, for 
instance, that in the case of organic matter natural selection can function as something 
akin  to  a  design,  and  even  account  for  the  presence  of  concealing  mechanisms. 
Besides, many situations which do not imply any kind of concealment are still far from 
the mere ‘low salience’ of chair-burning affordances. We believe, however, that hidden 
affordances  broadly  following  under  the  ‘secret-door’  description  are  those  more 
interesting for the study of innovation. While it can occasionally lead to innovation, the 
unmasking of chair-burning affordances is usually more directly related to other kinds 
of progress, such as the fine-tuning of previously existing strategies and mechanisms. 
Secret-door  affordances,  on  the  other  hand,  can  be  used  to  explain  most  of  the 
paradigmatic cases of innovation, in which both the acquisition of truly new information 
and  a  conscious  search  for  unnoticed  structures  and  elements  of  a  situation  are 
involved.
Even if the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ resources is not crucial to 
the analysis of innovation and can be beneficially avoided in many cases, there is a 
coincidence between those situations matching our ‘secret door’ scenario and those 
described in some of the extended cognition literature. Many of the cases traditionally 
labelled  as  ‘scaffolding’  are  at  least  very  good  candidates  for  ‘secret-door-like 
affordance  hunting’,  as  they  involve  both  goal-oriented  activity  and  the  kind  of 
designed, complex objective situations in which aspects leading to the appearance of 
relevant affordance may remain undetected by an agent.
In the following sections, we will assess two crucial cases of innovation on our 
cognitive capacities and processes, in which innovation appears through the detection 
of previously hidden, ‘secret-door-like’ affordances of scaffolded cognitive practices.
3. THE NARRATIVE PRACTICE HYPOTHESIS
We  believe  that  Hutto’s  Narrative  Practice  Hypothesis  (NPH)  offers  a  highly 
paradigmatic example of the ‘secret-door-hunting’ kind of innovation presented in the 
previous section, and at the same time provides some hints on the general strategies 
that can be used to promote further innovation of the like. Hutto offers an account of 
the human capacity to understand reasons for action that stands in direct contrast with 
the more widely known proposals, Theory Theory and Simulation Theory. According to 
the  NPH,  the  ability  to  understand  reasons  is  ontogenetically  and  phylogenetically 
posterior  to  the  ability  to  use  language  in  advanced  ways  (Hutto,  2008:  129-142, 
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233-243),  and does not  depend  on the existence  of  neither  interiorized,  contentful 
‘rules and principles’, nor any internal module specialized in simulating reason (Hutto, 
2008: 61-63). Furthermore, Hutto denies the necessity of postulating any mechanism 
akin to Fodor’s Language of Thought (Hutto, 2008: 88-95), and with it the plausibility of 
the idea of propositional content being involved in the most basic forms of cognition. 
Instead, the role of conveying propositions is exclusively fulfilled by human language 
itself,  and the basic capacity to interact with one another’s motives and reasons is 
acquired through the agent’s immersion in second and third person narrative practices, 
such as storytelling.
According to the NPH, mature folk psychology and the recognition of reasons 
for action are, in a certain sense, a by-product of the structure of advanced language: 
while early hominids and children are able to involve in relatively complex cognitive 
tasks through the use of non-(propositionally)-contentful intentional attitudes and with 
the help of retention and imagination, the use and understanding of reasons is made 
possible only after the complexities of a fully developed grammar is available.
Although Hutto does not use this description himself, we can characterize his 
account appearance of folk psychological abilities as an example of innovation through 
the unearthing of secret-door affordances. If his explanation is right, the possibility of 
using the kind of logical, combinatorial resources needed to understand proper reasons 
for  action  was  already  implied  in  the  symbolic  structure  of  fully  developed  human 
languages  well  before  the  use  of  socio-cultural  narrative  practices  made  Folk 
Psychology as we understand it  now appear.  Such an appearance was as late as 
between 60000 – 30000 BC, i.e. not amongst early hominids, but at the moment of the 
cultural bloom of homo sapiens. And, as with any culturally-based species of cognitive 
scaffolding, the long-term development of these practices surely required an effort in 
deliberate research and experimentation, without which the potential afforded by the 
use  of  language  in  narrative  situations  would  not  have  been  determined  at  such 
fine-grain level. 
This suggests also the salient possibility that this development is still occurring 
at some level today. While it is a fact that most human communities are now able to 
use folk psychology to understand proper reasons and explain actions, it is reasonable 
to  suppose  that  the  specifics  of  modern  narrative  practice  (and  any  number  of 
supplementary activities, such as scientific inquiry) still have an import in defining what 
it is to ‘understand reasons’ in a proper way. With regard to this we believe, again, that 
the exploration of the uses of language, its different vehicles, and very specifically the 
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investigation  of  basic  narrative  forms  is  a  privileged  example  of  the  practice  of 
secret-door affordance hunting.
4. FORMAL LANGUAGES AS COGNITIVE TECHNOLOGY
A second illuminating episode of cognitive innovation, later on the cultural development 
of humanity, is the development of formal languages as cognitive technologies. In her 
recent book  Formal Languages in Logic  (2012) Catarina Dutilh Novaes argues that 
«reasoning with formal languages and formalisms can have a truly mind-altering effect; 
it may allow human agents to counter some of their most deeply engrained cognitive 
biases, such as the tendency to rely on and seek to ‘hold on’ to prior belief» (2012, p. 
248).
Human  reasoning  tends  to  doxastic  conservativeness.  We  typically  display 
many biases that have to do one way or another to the tendency to take our previous 
beliefs  to  bear  in  reasoning.  Deductive  reasoning  serves  to  counterbalance  such 
doxastic  conservativeness.  The  development  of  deductive  reasoning  in  dialogical 
practices of adversarial communication, where the role of each contender is to try to 
rebut the claims that the other advances (Mercier and Sperber, 2012; Dutilh Novaes, 
2013) is in itself a very interesting case of cognitive innovation through scaffolding. The 
social  distribution  of  the roles  of  constructing  arguments and evaluating  arguments 
makes balanced reasoning emerge from the group. But Dutilh Novaes’ focus is more 
specific. She takes the development of formal languages on the wider context of the 
development of mathematical notations and, more generally, of writing systems, which 
was guided by the search for more efficient tools for calculation. From here she argues 
that «formal languages are an even more powerful debiasing technology to counter 
doxastic conservativeness in specific contexts» (2012, p. 159). 
The role of formal languages in reasoning, according to Dutilh Novaes, is best 
understood from a framework that rejects absolute divides between internal cognitive 
processing and external resources, such as Sutton’s ‘second-wave extended cognition’ 
(2010) or Menary’s ‘cognitive integration’ (2007). This claim is backed with empirical 
evidence from the neuroscience of reading and writing, and from results by Landy and 
Goldstone (2007)  that  show how sensorimotor  processing is crucial  in  dealing  with 
formalisms, or to put it more crudely, that formal reasoning is mostly about “pushing 
and dragging symbols”.
From an extended cognition point of view, manipulating formal languages and 
formalisms is constitutive of the cognitive processes in question; as such, the 
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perceptual properties of a formalism become crucial in that these manipulations 
are bodily engagements which elicit  sensorimotor systems in human agents. 
Moreover, I have argued that this externalization of reasoning processes does 
not only extend the mind; it actually alters the mind, albeit perhaps temporarily, 
in that it allows the reasoning processes to run on a different software, as it  
were,  countering  some  of  the  well-documented  reasoning  biases.  (Dutilh 
Novaes 2012, p. 196)
The upshot of formal reasoning is its debiasing effect. This is achieved in virtue of the 
de-semantification inherent in the formalization. Sometimes debiasing is also due to 
‘re-semantification’.  That  is,  «the possibility  of  applying a given formalism, which is 
developed  against  a  specific  background,  to  a  different  problem,  phenomenon,  or 
framework» (Dutilh Novaes 2012, p. 7). This effect is most relevant when logical or 
mathematical apparatuses are used as tools for scientific inquiry, as formal reasoning 
increases the chances to come to unexpected results. When squared within a suitable 
cognitive  framework,  this  amounts  to  the  externalization  and  automatization  of  the 
reasoning process, is compellingly cast in a famous quote by Whitehead, which sees in 
this phenomenon a major vector of human innovation: 
[B]y  the  aid  of  symbolism,  we  can  make  transitions  in  reasoning  almost 
mechanically  by  the  eye,  which  otherwise  would  call  into  play  the  higher 
faculties of the brain. It is a profoundly erroneous truism […] that we should 
cultivate the habit of thinking what we are doing. The precise opposite is the 
case. Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations 
which we can perform without thinking about them. (Whitehead, 1911, p. 61).
5. CONCLUSION
Both  the  development  of  Folk  Psychology  through  narrative  practice  and  the 
development  of  formal  reasoning through linguistic  and material  scaffolding are not 
only highly paradigmatic examples of what we have called the secret-door hunting style 
of innovation, but also clear instances of proper cognitive innovation: the result of this 
scaffolded advances is precisely an enhancement of human cognitive abilities. 
By focusing on the innovation processes underlying cognition, we aim to recast 
the cognitive processes underlying innovation in general into a different perspective. 
Innovation,  we  suggest,  would  be  best  understood  as  a  scaffolded  process  of 
disclosure of hidden affordances. Although the cases discussed might seem to be very 
distant to current talk of innovation, one of the morals of the view we propose is that the 
gap between cognitive innovation and innovation in general is indeed not so big as it is 
typically believed. 
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First, with regard to the timescale, we must take into account that many of the 
processes of cognitive innovation that occurred thousands of years ago on the cultural 
evolution of the species, are still somehow reproduced on the individual level. Dutilh 
Novaes remarks this in the case of formal reasoning: «When it comes to deduction, we 
may say that ontogeny –the onset of deductive reasoning in an individual reasoner– to 
some  extent  recapitulates  phylogeny  –the  historical  emergence  of  the  concept  of 
deduction» (2013, p. 453). Something similar might apply to the development of folk 
psychology through narrative practices.
Second, although purely accidental innovation (i.e. that in which there was not 
even a deliberate intent to discover through experimentation) is surely possible in some 
cases and individual instances of innovative advances are not necessarily relevant to 
the cognitive capacities of agents, any general strategy for promoting innovation can be 
considered  a  cognitive  resource  in  itself.  In  this  sense,  both  of  the  affordance 
discovering strategies commented  here  ('chair-burning' and 'secret-door-hunting') are 
instances of cognitive scaffolding, as they use the environment and its properties to 
enrich the agents' knowledge and to solve problems.
Third, the blurring of the line distinguishing properly cognitive innovation and 
'general' innovation is also, to an extent, the result of the very gesture of integrating the 
'internal' and 'external' dimensions of the explanations of innovation. Inasmuch as we 
take transcranial aspects of a situation to be part of cognitive processes, innovations 
that seemed entirely non-cognitive before (such as a new way to handle a tool, or a 
new computer interface) can be seen as having a cognitive import.
Furthermore,  we  contend  that  in  order  to  maximize  innovation,  ‘secret-door 
hunting’  strategies  like  the  examples  discussed  illustrate  pay  off  more  than 
‘chair-burning’ strategies, which are common in phases of technique refinement. That 
can  be  done  in  different  ways.  Making  inferences  and  hypothesizing  possible 
‘secret-door-like’  hidden affordances is probably  the best  strategy to find them, but 
brute force experimentation with unusual actions could also work. That’s more or less 
what  serendipity  cases are instances of.  This,  of  course,  falls  short  of  a recipe for 
innovation.  But  further  research  from  the  point  of  view  here  sketched  could  well 
develop more thorough guidelines for systematic innovation enhancement.
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